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CHAPTER I.
A STATEIENT 0' THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS,
ITS EXTENT, REASONS and IMPORTANCE.
(1)

STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE.
The rule -of Stare Decisis is of ancient

origin.

Precisely when it became a distinctly estab-

lished doctrine of English law is not easy to detormine.
In Croke's Reports in the seventeenth year of the reign
of James I, 1584, (Cro.Jac.,527) the reporter summarizes
the ratio decidendi thus: "Wherefore, upon the first
argument it was adjudged for the defendant, for they
said that those things which have been so often adjudicated ought to rest in peace." This seems to be a very
accurate and condensed expression of the doctrine.
The name Stare Decisis is taken from the Latin
maxim, stare decisis et non quieta movere, and the trans
lation of the maxim is a good definition of the rule
itself: To stand by prechdent and not to disturb what is
settled.

It may be called the doctrine of precedent or

of authority.

Its meaning is that when a point of law

has been once solemnly and necessarily sei.tled by the
decision of a competent court it will no longer be con-

siderod upen to
saoe

xamination or to a new ruling by the

tribunal or those which are bound to follow its

adj udications.
The general rule as laid down by the authorities

i,; as follows:

lowed unless flatly

"Precedents and rules must be folabsurd or unjust;

for though their

reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a
deference to former times as not to supi-ose
acted wholly without consideration;"

that

they

but "if it be found

a former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it
is declared~noL that such a sentence was bad law,but
that it was not law."

(1

Blackstone's Commentaries,

pp.69-70.)
It might be considered as a kind of legal
axiom that courts should not exercise their jurisdiction in

any random manner for this would speedily land

everything in "confusion worse confused."

Of necessity

there must be certain fixed land-marks apj roaching correctness, though not infallibly perfect;
should be guided by these even though a

and courts
rigorous adher-

ence to them might at tines work individual hardship.
These land-marks are,

of corse, yrior decisions servinm

as precedents not lightly to be changed.

(2) EXiEyT 01P THE DOCTRIAO.
The doctrine of Stare DOcisis is generally
characterized by law-writers as a product or principle
Blackstone and Kent claim it as such

of the Coi.-ion law.

and the United States Supreio Court (1 LI.Coin.,70; 1
1 nt's Com.,475-479;

Carrcll v. Carroll, 16 IHow.,2,37)

refers to it expressly as "a rule which belongs to the
common law" and there is an implication in the orinion
that it

is

limited to "courts orrganized under the conanon

law."
That it
law there is

is

a doctrine or rule of the cormnn

no doubt,

but that it

belongs to the common

la,. in any exclusive sense of origin, application or
usage is incorrect.

In the first place, it is a rule

equally applicable and equally applied in equity as in
the common law.

Thus Blackstone says, in repelling th e

idea that equity consists of the "opinion of the judre":
*The system of our court of equity is

an elaborate,

con-

nected system governed by established rules and bound
down by precedents from which they do not depart alt o :the reason of some of them may perhaps be liable to o1jection."

"May,' he adds, "sometiies a precedent is so

strictly followed in equity that a particular audrment
founded upon special circumstances !gives rise to a ren-

eral rule."
In

(3 Bl. Com.,4
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the next place,

to have kad its

place in

.)
this doctrine may be said
Thus in

the Romnyn law.

the new

Codex Constitutionum of Justinian, A.D.,534, the Codox
repetitae pralectionis, lib.1, tit.XIV,12, De Legibus et
constitutionibus principum et edictis,

it

is

decreed,

(translated); "Whenever the Emperor has judicially considered a case and announced a decision to the parties
that have appeared in the controvercy, let all judges,
without exception, within our juriddiction, know that
this is the law not only for the individual case in
which it was rendered but also in all like cases."
(See also Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence,I,Sec.3 5 8 .)

(3) REASON OF THE DOCTRINE:
The reasons which underlie this rule are
stated by Chancellor Kent is

a rm.ch quoted passar:' from

his Corimentaries, as follows: uA solemn decision upon a
point of law arising in any given case becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence
which we can have of the law applicable to the subject,
and tin judges are bound to follow that decision so long
as it

stands unreversed,

unless it

can be shown that the

law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular
case.

If

a decision has been made upon solemn argument

5
and mature
its

deliberation, the presirption is

in favor of

correctness; and the comv-unity have a riht

to re-

gard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law
and to regulate their actions and contracts by it.

It

would, therefore, be extremely inconvenient to the public
if precedents were not duly regarded and implicitely
followed.

It is by the notoriety and stability of such

rules that professional men can give safe advice to those
who consult the-,-,

and people in general can venture with

confidence to buy and trust and to deal with each other.
If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded,
we should disturb and unsettle the great land-marks of
property.

When a rule has been once deliberately adopted

and declared it

ought not to be disturbed unless by a

court of appeal or review and never by the same court
except for very cogent

reasons and upon a clear mani-

festation of error; and if

the practice were otherwise

it would be leaving us in a state of rerplexing uncertainty as to the law."

(1 Kent's Com.,475; to the same

effect, Jones on Bailments, 60; Lutler v. Duncomb, 1 P.
Wms.,4b2; Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns.,402; Bates v.
Reljea, 20 Jend.,340;

Cooley's Const.Lim.,50.)

(4) I-2ORTANCE OF THE DOCTRI:-:
The importance of a strict and rational ad-

6
herence to the doctrines of adjudged cases is
exemplified in

remarkably

the 7rowth o' l7nglish Constitutional
To quote from a distinguished writer, on

jurisprudence.

public questions:

"The principle of precedent is eminentThe English Constitution would not

ly philosophical.
have developed itself

What

without it.

is

called the

English Constitution consists of the fundamentals of the
Eritish polity laid down in customs, precedents, decisias
and statutes;

and the conon law in

portion than the statute la,.u
And in

it

is

a far greater

(Lieber's Civil Liberty.)

our own country the maintenance of this

doctrine is of peculiar importance on account of the
deference which we are accustomed to pay to the decisions
of the law courts even in cases where their logical
correctness

is

open to doubt.

This recognition of the

power and provisions or the judicial tribunals in

the

guidance and settlement of our civil institutions leads
the American citizen to Wield his implicite obedience
to their doctrines, even when the decision of a court
lays a controlling and shaping hand, not formally perhaps,

but,

in

the necossaj.y deductions from its

con-

clusions, upon the most zealously debated political
questions or the most important affairs of government.
Then if

progress is

desirable,

if

the ;rowth of the

7
nation in the perfect development of constitutional
governrnt as well as in
tions be a desideratum,

the stability

instiLu-

of its

these objects can certainly not

be abtained by a disregard of the principlo of Stare
Decisis.

Our past history declares this truth with un-

mistakable voice.

To appreciate its

value we have only

to reflect how seriously the progro3s of American federalism would have been retarded if

the interpretation put

upon the Constitution by the Supreme Court

in the forma-

tive period of our national character had been thought
open to contradiction by any and every court.
jection is

sametimes made to the "adherence

An ob-

of courts to

musty, moldy authoriLies and antique forms mnd customs,
whereby they seem to be wedded to error and absurdities,
sanctioned and venerated merely because they have the
flavor of age about them, while everything else is revolving in the whirl of progress."

Undoubtedly there is

some point in the sensure both as to statutes and adjudications, but the objection may easily b- carried too
far.

There ought to be established standards of judg-

ment and it is too much to require that those shall be
absolutely infallible.

Conservatism is equally as need-

ful in the movement of society, of politics, of science

8
of law and of everything in which mankindlas a general
interest, as prog;ress is.

And it is needful also to

demand duo credentials from every innovation and to receive propositions of change with slow deliberation, although without prejudice.

Conservatism and progress

should be, though opposites, yet co-operative, and constantly in action.

And it is highly proper that time

should largely enter into the authority,

the sacredness

and the veneration attaching to customs and rules established by the legal wisdom and learning of form,
ner
sages of the law.

For the longer a rule has continued

the more thoroughly has it become interwoven with the
business and property interests of the community at
large, and therefore the more disasterous must be the
change, especially a sudden change.

When once a princi-

ple has been fully recognized it should not be changed
unless it is found to be unbearably wrong or unless it
is changed or abrogated by the legislature, to whom the
correction of errors ought usually to be left.
are rules concerning whicih it

"There

is more important that

they should be in some way settled than that they should
be settled in any particular mannor.

CHAPTER II.

The I-rinciple of

PROPER LI .JITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINJE.

Stare Decisis is subject to certain necessary and propor
limitations which on the one hand secure and enhance its
practical utility and on the other prevent its abuse.
The more important of these limitations will be discussed.
(1) OVER-RULED CASES.
If a decision has been expressly over-ruled
either by the same court whicI rendered it
exercising appellate jurisdiction, it
longer be cited as a precedent.

or by a court

can, of course,

no

The latest utterance of

the court on any given point of law constitutes the
authority which is
And the same

is

not to be departed from without

cause.

true of decisions over-ruled by necossarY

implication in a subsequent case.
necessary to show beyond reasonable

Eut here it

would be

cavil that the two

authorities were really and necessarily inconsistent
rulings on a state of facts substantially identical.
An excdption,

however,

would probably be made in

case of a single decision probably erroneous,

the

which would

over-rule a series of previous authorities or unsettle
the established principles of comercial law.
fdagruder,

10 Cal.282.)

If

(Aud v.

a rule of law has been cliang-

ed by legislative enactment the autlxrities are unanimouls
that it is stripped of all bindin; force.

(2) TWO EXTREMES TO EE AVOIDED.
"That doctrine" says Lovie,
the rule under consideration,

J.,

slpeaking of

"though incapable of being

expressed by any sharp and rigid definition and therefore incapable of becoming an institute of =do positive
law is

among the most important of good governrent.

But

like all such principles in its ideal it presents its
medial and its extreme aspects and is approximately defined by the negation of its extremes.

The conservatism

that would make the institutions of to-day the rule of
to-morrow and thus cast society in the rigid molds of
positive law in order to get rid of the embarassing
but wholesome diversities of thought and practice that
enure to free,rational and

imperfect beings; and the

radicalism that, in ignorance of the laws of hnnan progress and disregard of the rights of others, would lightly
esteem all official precedents and -eneral customs that
are not measured by its own idiosyncrasies; each of' these
extremes always tends to be converted into the other and
both stand rebuked in every voltue of our jurisprudence.
And the medial aspect of the doctrine stands every where
revealed as the only proper one.

Ilot as au

arbi-

trary rule of positive law attributinC to the mere memory
of cases higher honor and greater value than belongs to
the natural instincts and common feeling of right; not
as withholding allowance for official fallibility and for
the changing views,

pursuits and customs that are caused

by and that indicate an advanced civilization;

not as

underrating and thus deadening the form3 that give expressions to the living spirit; not as enforcing 'the
when the:, 'make

traditions of the elders'

void the law'

in its true sense; nor as fixing all opinions that have
ever been pronounced by official functionaries;

but as

yielding to them the respect which their official character demnds and which all
(CallendervKeystone
(3)

1,!ut.

Food

education enjoys.9
23 Pa.St.,474.)

Life Ins.Co.,

DECISION MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS.
Hence,

in the third place,

if

the decision is

clearly incorrect, whether from a mistaken conception of
the law or through the misapplication of the law to the
facts and no injurious results would be likely to flow
from a reversal of it

and especially if

it

is

injurious

and unjust in its operation, it is not only an allowable
departure from precedent but the iinlerative duty of the
court to reverse it.

(Linrl v.

1M.inor, 4 Nev.,462; Paul v.

Davis, 100 Ind.,422; Snydor v. Gascoigne, 11 Tex.,449;

McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa.St.,423.)&
But from this rule is to be exfopted the case
of a settled and established rule of property founded
upon a series of erroneous decisions.

It is only upon

serious considerations that the court will overthrow
such a rule no matter how incorrect the previous authorThis point will be discu5sed in another con-

ities.
nection.

(4) ISOLATED CASES.
A single decision upon any given point of law
is not regarded as conclusive as a precedent in the same
degree that a series of decisions upon that point would
be.

(Duff v. Fisher, 15 Cal., 375; 'ells on Res Adjudi-

cata &c.,

Sees.589,599.)
The Supreme Court of California declares that

the doctrine of Stare Decisis will load it to conf~rm
to a principle of merchantile law established all over
the world rather than to follow a decision of its own
made a few years before, which is a very decided and
injurious innovation upon that principle.

(Aud v.

hiagrunder, 10 Cal.,282.)
(5)

OBLITER DICTA.
The maxim of Stare Decisis contemplates only

such points as are actually involved and determined in

13
the case and not what

said by the court or judge out-

is

side of' the record or on points not necessarily involved
Such expressions do not become precedents.

therein.

(Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 399; Rx Parte Christy, 3
How., 322, dissenting opinion of Catron, J.; Peck v.
Jenness, 7 11ow.,
In

612; Carroll v. Carroll, 16 ]low.,287.)

Mlarshall said:

Justice

Virginia

the case of Cohen v.
"It

is

(supra) Chief

a maxim not to be dis-

regarded that reneral expressions in every opinion are
to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used.

If

they go beyond the case they
a

may be respected but do not control the judgment in
subsequent

suit when the very point is

in

its

full extent;
it

illustrate

investigated with care and considered
other principles which may serve to

are considered in

their relation to the

case decided but their possible bearing on all
cases is

The

The question actually

reason of this maxim is obvious.
before the court is

presented.

the other

seldom completely investigated.u
Iut this limitation of the maxim inhmm must

itself

be taken with a limitation.

Thus,

point may not have been fully argued,

although a

yet the decision of'

the court uponThus, although that be the case the decision of the

14
acurt cannot be considered obliter dicta when the question was directly involved in the issues of law raised
by demurrer and the mind of the court was directly drawn
to and distinctly expressed upon thie subject.

(.ichael

v. .ore,, 26 I.d., 239.)
So, where a question rearded by the court as
of general importance is solermly decided after full
argument and consideration and with a purpose to settle
tie law, it has been held as not inconsistent with the
doctrine of obliter dicta that such a decision should
become a binding precedent, although the question was
not one necessary to be determined by the court.

This

was laid down in the remarkably able opinion of the Court
of Appeals of haryland(in Alexander v. Worthington, 5
Md.,488,489): "All that is necessary to render a decision authoritative on any point decided is to show that
there was an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged.u
60 Wis.,

264;

(See also Buchner v. R.1'.Co.,

uells on Pes Adjudicata

Sec.582.)
3c.,

This seems to be a darerous liiuitation of the
doctrine and tends directly to rem-ove one of t;ie chief
supports and benefits of t.e

doctrine of 5tare Decisis;

for if a court may consider a question not necessarily
involved in the case and render a decision thereon which

15
shall rise to the rank of a precedent

it is easy to see

how soon our courts might be occupied in

considering

purely academical topics and erecting into precedents
their vie-vs of what the law ought to be rather than what
it

is.

Whatever authority there may be for it,

limitation is
Stare Decisis.

such a

opposed to the true idea and doctrine of
However well considered or wise or a

logical conclusion however irresistible or a conclusion
or analogy, it must be the very point, as Chief Justice
Marshall calls it, arising in the case.

Webster de-

fines (fdecision" as "the act of settling or terminating
a controvercy by giving the victory to one side."

If a

question is not in controvercy, no decision in the proper sense of the word can be rendered on it.
decision is
vercy,

Again,

"a

the act of settling or terminating a contro-

but a process of reasoning, a syllogism or logical

induction or deduction is in no proper sense a decision
of a controvercy."

For this reason a court often fol-

lows a decision as a precedent while expressly rejecting
the reason by which it was 6ririnally supported.

CHAPTER III.
THE RULE AS BETWEEN DIFFERENT COURTS
OF TIM SANE STATE.
(1)

AS BETWEEN SUBORDINATE AND APPELLATE COURTS.
The rule is

Attorney-General v.
said:

well laid down in

the case of

Lunn (2 Wis.,507); the court there

"The decisions of the highest appellate court upon

points in judgment presented and passed upon in cases
brought before it are the law of the land until over(See

ruled and inferior courts are bound to obey them."
also Gibson v. Chouteau, 7 ,,ro.App.,l.)
On the other hand the rule is

equally well

settled that the opinion of a nisi prius court, though
perhaps admissible as persuasive evidence of the principle contended for is

of course not binding as a precedent

upon the appellate court,

except in

one instance,

viz,

that the Suprewe court will adopt the construction
placed

by the inferior court upon its

practice, (miix

v.

Chandler,

44 Ill.,

own rules of
174).

The decisions of the chief appellate
a territory before its

erection into a state,

court of
or of the

supreme court of a state prior to the adoption of a new
constitution,

will be recognized and followed by its

successor under the new constitution unless manifestly

17
(Iowa),2 72 ;
erroreous; (Doolittle v. Shelton, 1 Greene
Emery v. Reed, 65-Cal., 351.)
(2)

AS

ETWEIEN COURTS OF CO-ORDINATE JURISDICTION.

New
It has been held by the supreme court of
the samne state,
York that as between nisi rrius courts of
in some instances applica-

the rule of Stare Decisis is
ble.

29 Tar.5,

(Andrews v. Wallace,

Goodwin,

38 Barb.,

633.)

350; Bentley v.

In the former New York case
as follows:

the language of the court is

uTwo or more

codecisions concurring on the same Toint made by
ordinate branches of the sae

court in different dis-

tricts should be recognized as precedents in the other
districts until reversed by a higher authority.'

The same

rule has been acknowledged in federal court decisions.
(The Chelmsford, 34 Fed. Rep., 399; Reed v. Ry.Co.,21
Fed.Rey.,22S3.)

In the case of the Chelmsford (supra)

the District Court for the Central District of Pa.,
nounced that it

followed a prior decision of' another

district on the same point,

althouh it

considered such

decision not foinded upon sound principles"
v.

an-

Ry.Co.(C.C..Y.)

(supra),

So in, feed

in an action to establish

an implied maratime lieri arainst a vessel for Sll-lies
furnished at the hrome port at the owner's request and
shipped to the vessel elsewhere,

the court said:"In nei-

18

ther case (referring to two prior decisions upon the
is

point by tile Circuit Courts of other districts)

the

subject discussed at any length or any adequate reason
my judgment,

assigned,

in

So great,

however,

importance I

attach to uni-

of decisions by coul-ts of' co-ordinate jurisdic-

foriity

tion that

constrained to adopt the rule thus es-

I feel

tablished."
Phil.,
xcc,

the

is

for the conclusion reached.

(See

'.rs.ick

also

£.1'g Co.

0 Ped., U.S.D.C.Pa., 625; 1horton v. Taxing Dist.
36 Fed.,99.)
But in a late Ciiucuit Court decision (.4orthern

Pacific T,.R.Co.
said:
court

"Finally,

v. Sanders, i.lont.,

47

decides a point all

the others

decision until

should conform

not the rule which prevails
United States.

in

the Circuit

with the decisiona of another Circuit
satisfied

that

Dut this is
Courts of the

A United States Circuit Court,

ly always with reluctance will use its

it

is

erroneousi"

the opposite of a

undoubted-

to disagree

right

court even when

The Court then pro-

ceeded to give a construction to the grant
aid of the iorthern

set-

is

the matter

by the rulings of' the Supreme Court.

tled

is

'fed., 604) it

urges that when ()ne Circuit

plaintiff

views to this

their

in

City of

v.

of Congress

Pacific Railroad Company,

directly

prior decision oi' the sa i:o subject by

another Circuit court,

and concludes

thus:

"In

the

EiV)le

19
there

is

'Thou

a coi~riand,

shalt not follow the pflltitude
apleared con-

to do evil'"which to the mind of the court

elusive of the matter.
qualified and i'urther explained in

The rule is

the case of Groenbaumn v.
"When there is

Daly,226),

of' equal ra.n-k in

which the point

is

as follows:

('t d,cisions on a given point

a conflict

among the tribunals
in

Stein (2

a

the court

state

decided upon mature

deliberation

should adhere to its decision until over-r-uled by a
court of last resort."
quotations from circuit

Froi-m the brief
court decisions

district

and

we can see the attitude

(above)

of the different circuits and districts as to the Doctrine of Stare Decisis.
courts ia

L4ut the question berore these

only whether or not the decision of another

district will be considered as binding until an adverse
decision of t he Supreme Court is rendered and conse-

will

to adhere

of a refusal

quently the evils
not be great,

because

to the principle

iMi iriportant cases involving

any considerable amount an apieal may be had from these
courts to thie Circuit

S.preme Court.
with reference
courts.

Court of Appeals and the U.S.

The people
to

the settled

c.

e-n age in
rulin.s

By the Act of Congress,

enterprises

of the latter

the Circuit Court of

20
Appeals of the United States was established (1891).
Final a.Tlellate jurisdiction i3 given to that cout in
many cases subject to a review in certain excer tional
cases by the -Supreme Court.

I have carefully examined

the t,;;( volum°es of reported cases already issued from
the Cir.Ct. of Appeals and have failed to find any
decisions directly in conflict.

Ii', however, any of the,

courts reftise to follow prior decinsions of other circuits the enormous evils and injuries resulting which
were prophesized by"nrlisl, critics at the time of the
passage of the act will undoubtedly be felt.
In L1-ew York,

Virginia apid other states during

different periods of lon-er or shorter duration temporary
tribunals have been organized for the purpose of giving
aid to the court of last resort in t}he state when its
docket has becoi e crowded.

One of these special courts

in Virginia having on its reversal of a decree rei-manded
the case for ilirthe_- lproceedins in the court below,
which lower colurt in the sequel pursued the mandate sent
it,

the Supreme Court of that state on a second appeal

held that it

could not entertain a complaint of error

either in or behind the decree of the special court.
(Polling v.

Lersen, 26 Gratton,

,6;

hiorvell v.

Cam, 2

Rand.,68,85; Corvell v. Zeluff, 12 Gratton, 226,234.)
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In similar cases in !ow York,

after a decision by the

Con-'nissioners of' Apjeals and a oocond appeal which came
before the Court of Appeals itself, the latter court
declined to inquire whether the J'oner court had l decided

rightly.
58B.Y.,

(Terry v.
411.)

Wait,

And te

56 11-.Y.,

samte is

91; relton v. Baxter,

true as to the recent

Second Fivision of the Court of AI eals,
P:eck,

129 I..Y.,

7,

(W1,annin- v.

(dictum).),

But in '.ew York when the questionl htis arisen
whether a decision of the Corrissioners of Appeals or a
decision of the Court of Appeals cozlflictin7 with it

in

different cases should be follo-,ed by a s-ubordinate
court,

the decision of the Court of Appeals has been

held entitled to preference as of higher authority,
without an attempt at estimating the comparative weight
of the several decisions them.iselves respectively considered on their own intrinsic
12 11un,

580,584.1)

orits.

(Conner v. Veber,

CIIAPT[!T:

IV.
[JJD

T'7.. RULE A-) ., WEF.,

'.A,,

A'.]) STATE COURTS.

-IPo1

The decisions7 of th, e

O t- e
ef'

't

United States upon the costruction of the Federal Constitution or t; o laws of thc Inion are concl,,sivo and

and the statutes of

inter. retation of the orr'Tanic lav

in

dictio.
iu

,Vet tle

these matters

TLeba o,-. 7ank v.

,

,onvers:7

I

-

of a st-ate b: its

ii.) iest judicial

bindi:

courts

Uo.-. t,, e.

'istyr v.

1Pridh'u,

....
th v.
:-"Jai.
4

,

ham,

7 id.,

52,; 7,or -an v.

l.2irkid.,

,

620;

ha _orrb

7-.,;

To.

Randall

2o ,-,

, 97

is

as

198;
!

id.,

v. Lr.r-

(A;
v.

law

. arren,

".icliol v. TLevy,

li;

3 id.,

al

v.
7

Cc-,.oc'.',e-,

','illia;a son v. Sriydar,

1 hcr.q)st

,ltatute

ffi'imll

to a

ic re:srded

a1

tii

(,

433;

Ai-led e,

givr.

of thie

as a part

as the text.
;

2

adop"t tiie decisions of

iterpretation

and the

e fCederal

true:

c(3., lI

of trhi 3 .- lo is

and constitutions;

t

69 III.,70;

in the colisti-iction oi' t ieir statutes

the state tribunals

in

resort

-,- t.......

2

fedoral courts wiil uni-c'nl

"ve

courts of last
Lusk,

(Black v.

state:;.

the several

juris-

arpellate

a certai,

e
.rcises

court

and

o'07 judiciary,

thie nation properly belonrs to its
bcause, that

both because the

state tribunrals;

bindi.;--..;, :-on all te

,o
.3.

V.

, 181;

Davis v.

riggs,

Louisville etc.
Bain,

id.,628; Ry.Co.

v.

Ry.

Ganies,

133 U.S.,

587; Peters v.

Thus on the question of ihether a

670.)

id.,

Liss.,

v.

23
id.,697;

the

state tax law cniforms to the state constitution,
federal courts are boumd b:
of last resort.

(Dundee

°

decisions of the state courts

iortr. Co.

v.

Parris'-,

24 Fed.,

i37. )

But there is

one exception to this rule,

When the constitutional enactment or statute is

viz,-

alleged

to be in violation of tha federal constitution or laws
the United States,
ofithe Supreme Court will be at liberty to put its
own
construction upon it;
tion is

for example,

when the act in

objected to as controvonirv

ques-

the constitutional

prohibition of lerislation impairing the obligation of
contracts

tie court will ascertain for itself

indepen-

dently of the state decisions whether a contract

in fact

exists and whether the statute has tho effect attributed
to it.

(Jeff. ranch Tank v.

Louisville Qe. P.

iefiT, 9b U.S.,
Gornibey v.
U.S.

306.)

*v.

3kelly,

Palmer,

714; Cass Co. v.

Clark, 134 U.S.,
But it

53;

1 '-lack (U.S.),436;

109 U.1'.,

St.

244; Pennoyer v.

Louis,

Johnson v.

9b U.S.,485;
Fisk, 137

seems the decision of tiho UOited

States Supreme Court sustaining a state statute is not
binding on a state court when the saieo question arises

24
under a similar statute.

(People v. Eudd, 117 N.Y.,I.)

And on the question of inter-state extradition, it is
said the decisions of the state courts do not conclude
federal courts.

(Ex Parte fRoberts, 24 1'ed.,132.)

Where the rulings of the state court upon the
construction of its constitution or laws have been subject to

lmanges of opinion the federal courts will in

general follow the latest settled adjudications.

But

where a question was once definiLely settled by a series
of decisions in the state courtsuch decisions beitig austaned by re"a= and authority, ahd one or two later
cases over-rule them against all law and reason the
Supreme Court will not feel bound to follow every oscil-

lation of opinion.

(Gelpoke v. DubUque, 1 Wall., 175;

Marshall v. Elgin, 3 Mc~arn, C.Ct.,35, to sane effect)

And where the U.S. Circuit Court in a particular case
adopts the construction of a statute by the highest c curi
of the state and afterwards the state courts over-rule
the former decisions and interpret the statute differently, this will not authorize a reversal of the judgment
of the Circuit court.

(IMnran v. Curtenius, 20 Iow.,l;

Pease v. Peck, 18 How., 595; Burgess v. Siligman, 107
U.S.,

20; Keokuk v. Ry.Co., 41 Pod.,

305.)

So where the

Supreme Court has maturely adopted the construction

25
placed by the State court on the statutes of the state
and the latter court afterwards gives a different interpretation on the same act, it is deemed more respectable
to the U.S. Supreme Court for the Circuit and District
courts to adhere to its decisions rather than to adopt
the latest ruling of the State court until the question
shall be again reviewed.

(Ileal v.

Green, 1

cLoa",

18.)

But exactly the opposite course was taken in ':oore v.
Mleyer,

(47 ±'ed. Rol.,

Cir. Ct.,

99.).

In questions of -;neral cor -:ercial law t.e
state adjudications, though entitled to -reat respect,
do not furnish a binding rule of decision for the federal
courts;

and conversely the state courts in s' c> matters

are not concluded by the rulings of the national courts.
(Supervisors v.
100 U.S., 213;
V.

£Iorne-,

SchonckO Wall.,772;
71irrgess v. Selignria,

14 :;.Y.,

423; l'ickle v.

, v. R,7.Co.,
owh"
107 U.S., 20; Towle

The 'tank 88 '_enn.,380J

Thus, although the rule that thc law of the place whore
a contract is made will ordinarily igovern its
tation and applies to endorsements
yet when that law is

the co:i !o-

question as to what such law is

la:

interrTre-

of ne'-ctialc paper,
or la7 n'rci:ant the

will not be concluded

by the decisions of the hi,-Qost corrts of the state w'here
the endorsement is made, suit bein" brought in a differ-

26
ent jurisdiction.

(Franklin v. Twogood, 25 Iowa, 520.)

And in such a question as this, the federal courts are
not bound by the adjudications of the state wit1in whose
border3 they sit.

(National Fank v. Lock-sticl. Fence

Co., 20 Reporter, 235.)
So a decision of a state court involving only
the general principles of equity jurisprudence is not
binding as authority on the federal courts.

)Neves v.

Scott, 13 How., 269; Russell v. Southard, 12 How.,
139.)

CHAPTFR V.
T}HE RULE AS BETWEE2N
COURTS OF DIFIEREITT

STATES.
system of juris-

Rulings nmde under a similar
prudence prevailing in another state ma

be cited and

respected for their reasons but are not necessarily to

be accepted as g*ides, except in so far as those reasons
coirnond themselves to judicial mind.

(Caldwell v. Gale,

11 Mich., 77; Boyce v. St. Louis, 29 Barb., 650.) The

decisions of another state, however, is accepted as
authoritative guides in cases where a construction of
the statutory law of suah state became necessary.

(Lane

v. Watson, 51 N.J.Law, 186; Howe v. Welch, 14 Daly, 80;
Crooker v. Pearson, (Kan.), 21 Pac., 270.)
tut the opinion has been expressed that they
but
woUld be persuaSiveAnot conclusive as to such1 construction, where the statutes in question but not the decisions ari put in evidence.
555.)

(ITolson v. Goree, 34 Ala.,

CI APTER VI.
VALUE OF THE EIIGLISH DECISIO:7S.

"Great Britain and the thirteen original states
had each substantially the same system of conmon law
originallyand a decision now by one of the highent
courts of Great Britaili as to what the co,Tnon law Is
upon any point is

certainly entitled t,

in any6f'the states,

-rsat respeot

though not necessarily to beeo.

cepted as binding authorityany acre than the decisionS
of any one of the other states, upon the sar-

point.

It gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the
law is but its force as an authoritative declaration must
be confined to the country for wlich the court sits
judges.
is

in

Lira.,

and

But an PEn'lish decision before the revolution

thle direct line of authority."

(Cooley's Const.

(star pa;e) 52; see also Chapman v.

341; Koontz v.

Nabb.,

16 ;d,,

b49.)

Gray,

8 Ga.,

CUAPTZR VII.
02. SfATE R:471AC'2D

STATUTES 0'

I: ANOTER.
Where a particular statute or clausi of the
has been adopted in,

c:-.stitution

-,

state :1'c_- t:lc

0

statute ; o:- -,:,stitut.on of another after a judicial
in the last mentioned

corstruction has been put upon it

is but just to .er-ard the costruction as

,;tate, i

_,av .... been adoptedalong with t'.a words,

precedlc-.ts would follow as le-iti-

chief's of di:xoePardixf

(Co:.. v. Hartntt',

mrrately hero as in any other case.
3 'ra,.,
Co~t.

450; Bo -- is
Li;-.,

52.)

v.
.>i

it

adorting it

does rot follow necessarily

3 C( io,

And the sa-m

since t',c circ'-stances in the state

is

(Little v.

479;

is

2'-*th,

oole.

4 Scai,..,

Coast.

402; Cray

Tir:.,52 n.)

in r-eneral true ol Englis: statutes re-

enacted in thiis country.
serves: "It

be in-

vi7 't :c lau itst

-ft:, be so different as to require a differ-

ent co:istructLio..

v. Askew,

226; CooleyIs

1 .s.,

,ecker,

that the prior decision crrstr
flexibly followed,

a::d all the :,:ia-

Thus,

.

Justice Story ob-

dc'-tless tr,e as has
En,-,lis>* statutes

s"'-:t"&

o

at

stt?>

for exa ple

as the Statute of Frauds and t..- Statuze o f

Li.-itatio-.

the bar that wo

--

--

have beeh adopted into our own leislatio."

tie known

and settled construction of <'.ose statutes by coiut:

of

30

law had been considered as silently incorporated into
the acts or has been received with all the weight of
authority."

(Pennocck v. Dial'orue, 2 Peters, 18.)

CHAPTER VIII.
PROPERT( RIGITS TOT TO T" DIS
'J'MLZED 1Y REVERSAL OF DECISIO!S.

There are sonie que3tionn in law, the firal settlement of which is vastly ,more important than how t;ey are
settled; and wiong these are rules of property long recognized and acted upon an;] tmder which rights have
vested.
in

its

its

Aeordingly when a principle of law, doubtful
character and unertain

in

the subject matter of

oblif-ation has been settled by a series of judicial

decisions the court will hesitate lon,- before attempting
to ov :rthrow the result,
the previoi
v. i:rvwn, 3

notwithstanding t::' ray think

authorities to be e-tirely erroneous.
is.,

609; Rockhill v.

.oalson,

Harrow v. .lyers, 21J Id., 469; Yield v.
218;
7

:ihn v. C~rtis,

.ich.,

450;

In re Tasftar

F.P.Co. (Id), L

24 Ind.,422;

Coldshy,

'1 CZl., 398; Emerson v.

12; Paulson v. City of 2ortland,
('91)
[:.F..,

1 Th.,
lOb;

I- such oases it
rection cf the error to tho

2t

3cott v. Stenart

Ila.,

Atwater,

19 ?ac.,

3bS; Frank v.

8,97; Ross v. RcrsS (O'.), 26 1'ac.,

(Prat

(Or.),

Exansvill
(na.),

11

0CO:.)

is liotter to leave te
ieislatunre u2icl

cor-

can cortrol

its action so as to make it prospeotivc only and tihus

32
prevent unjus4. consequences.

these authrities

"t

must not be understood as holding that a previous line
of lecisions affecting property rirghts oan in any case
be ovor-,iil!hd.

That would be pushin
Hence if

to"ether too far.

it

the doctrine al-

s'ould a i ear thA-. tAe

evil3 resultin, from the princi- les ostallisied

-nst

prodlctive of -reat-r mischior to t. e co ; unity th}L::
possibly ensue fCor- disrof-ardin!
tinns on tlve subject t'e
(Poon v.
Johns.,

:owers, 30
722; Oakl,r v.

Fmor -uson, 34 IJI.

*

new

the

be
can

pi-vious ad.3ica-

Thm;Id

-ol"
,e c.eated.

ss., 246; '3ll~dol v. Jahso,-, 20
Aspinwall,

4'5; .To3lin v

13 i,.Y.,

500;1unifs v.

o,,56

Td

.,

6M6

.1,
.

CASP1.

TIlE

OF

LIAW

itaTER IX.

.n appellate

a case has been I'ecided ii

Oames there a ain b.; ajpeal or o:vit

court and : .oerwards

quesltions will. be noticed as were riot

,

of error only

tVi

ali",ady adji. dicated bec~o I

1. Y.1

Coweo,

T,; iA Joeiin v.

e,-tlson, .-4 id.,

0: kAsp
e? vnTa l , I
,-s., 20 .;

',A lan v .,

v.

15 iId.,

of tLo c;-st

'

tlvn,eto; a3d

lhw rf
trixl-,

t]le

i o

a,Ci-

56 id.,

,

9b

626;

4 1 ; Dzv d.sor,

20 Cal.,

ii' the facts ohani

ortPss

TIrrl% caoso in, tbn court :, tew
.o can,.e ti'
3oay

t ,o

C.

veral~l v . ,111is, 38

to require iE ne~~ ~v'

Prv - deci

2'Pot- :t iS cl;,

whole nature
a.-3

oal

1il c)so.3 to be tVN

that a p.arty cm a r.-

iay iitroduce 4-.r; eviienco and e tablish

an ontirely difr'ent
is

j

these

':-e.

de novo

r,

of the

. Iding,

afte ,'

l' to

26; ]urnlss v.

Cowrie,

,A.'10;f}{

8)

trial

on a s)oCld

(drbase v.

tM6 id.,

Joslin v.

45;

ill

law ol tY, cVmse and

subsequent sta'es.

any of its

,> law

(or rnicr a
i'omntCd

not be reversed or dfr
in

ints
)i

dec ison; t

prevui,

deiber:,Ined in ti

no vi',d Ation e,

state of fracLts ,o

c(XLLorm to which

rinciplis in a c;r'L o.ven ii" thevet,y

lc
deci siop. a. i. aj ,lic
does sct aside its forrinre
tefo nYio T.'iase (t. ti
itoed t
aOorL a nmw 010 f
,3OC.,GlO; d0 cai.,67 1 ;
on 1V ::,i.
(bus
cov.trovrccy.
it

cnqj

CTAPTER X.

Where the deliberations of the appollato court result in an aifirmance of' the Jukd,-i ont of the trial
cou.t in ce,-aequence of an oq,,al division of opinion
,mon-

the jud-1es tio bindin, rrecodent iz

tablished.

i nt in such a case,

The Jd

t:or

es-

alt.iough it

is

as conclusive upon tio riqlhts of the parties to the
litication :.s any other would be (Durant v.
7 Wall.,

107)

is

not considered a3 settling the q(ues-

tiOns of law as to cases which fnay arie
parLies.

(Iors

Johnson, 5 Wend.,

59,7W.

Co.,

Rusx

v.

11old,
I ,.,.,

'142; Etti i

v.

between other

2Pb;
-,nk

(f

rid'e v.
U.S.,

12 wheat.,

CFAPTPJR XI.
C 0 TC

T.

satirized it
era,

taro Decisi'

f

The doctrineo
be a rmch abused one.

I 0
be said to

otl,2r fields have

"aartists i

as a barreni and illogical dogzma;

so called, have characl.orized

it

philoso-h-

as a *crude rells
4inds have

idealists of all

of primitive u 4 ireason '
marked it

wa.

true devaloxnent

as the stiumbling block to t,

oi the science of the law; even the courts have dealt
it

almost ciu,.in:-, blows (For exam'plo,

Tendor Cases,

13 Wall.,

Neertheless,

it

457,

se,

riversing,

The Leal

" ''a.,60).

has survived.

The great result of the doctrine and idea of

Stare Decisis has been tat it has linked the whole of
our law to-other with bonds stronger than philosophy or

pure science could have constructed.
tented

to be shown in

As has been at-

the precedinf- pages of thils essay,

without th- Loctrine there could be no suitable or con-

sistent administration o

JustiCe,

no firm foundlation

even to vested rights, no security to property.

